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The Appellant, Michael F. Nyman, by and through his 
attorneys, respectfully submits the following Reply Brief in 
further support of his appeal. 
RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
The Appellant denies that he failed to adequately marshal 
the relevant facts. In response to the numbered paragraphs set 
forth by the Appellee, the Appellant states as follows: 
1. The statement that none of Appellant's tax notices make 
specific reference to Lot 17 assumes that Summit County's 
conveyance to Appellant in 1937 did not have the legal effect of 
a severance of that portion of Lot 17 occupied by Appellant's 
predecessors. Moreover, this is one of the key issues in this 
appeal. The Appellee's statement presumes that these tax notices 
are complete legal descriptions. Such a presumption is 
unwarranted. 
2. In response to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the Appellee's 
Statement of Relevant Facts, the Appellant informs the Court that 
these facts, as far as they are relevant to this appeal, have 
previously been set forth in Appellant's Statement of Facts 
paragraph numbers 9, 10 and 12. 
3. In response to paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the Appellee's 
Statement of Relevant Facts, the Appellant agrees with the 
statements contained therein. However, these statements are not 
relevant to the issues as they are presented on appeal. This 
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portion of Appellant's chain of title is not at issue. 
4. In response to paragraph number 8, the Appellant agrees 
that the current garage may have been built in 1948. However, 
the Appellant asserts that other structures and the perimeter of 
the property claimed by Appellant have been established and not 
objected to since at least 1906.x 
5. The Appellant agrees with the statement in paragraph 9 
of Appellee's Statement of Relevant Fact. What the Appellant 
meant was that Summit County's right to the property accrued in 
193 0 as a result of the non-payment of property taxes by Backman. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court wrongly granted summary judgment in favor of 
the Appellee. The Appellant (through his predecessors in 
interest) obtained his property from Summit County at a tax sale 
in 1937. The property acquired by Appellant in 1937 included a 
home and other structures, including a garage which, as it turns 
out, is situated on part of Lot 17 which Appellee claims he owns. 
Likewise, Appellee (through his predecessors in interest) 
obtained his property from Summit County at a tax sale subsequent 
to Appellant's acquisition of his property. 
The Appellant maintains that when he acquired his property 
from Summit County in 1937, he acquired the property as it was 
This fact was not asserted at the trial court level. 
This issue is a new one on appeal. 
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actually possessed. Thus, since he received a direct conveyance 
of the disputed property from Summit County, Summit County could 
not later convey to Appellee that which it had already conveyed 
to Appellant. 
In the alternative, Appellant has acquired title to the 
property by adverse possession. The Appellant has possessed the 
land in the statutorily prescribed manner in excess of the 
statutorily required time period. Moreover, under Utah law, the 
Appellant can assert a claim of adverse possession against Summit 
County. 
Finally, if the Court determines that the legal effect of 
the conveyance to Appellant in 1937 did not operate to create a 
severance of that portion of Lot 17 occupied by Appellant and the 
Court concludes that Appellant has not acquired title by adverse 
possession, the Court should find that the Appellant has a right 
to continued use of the disputed portion of Lot 17. The Appellant 
has occupied that portion of Lot 17 occupied by his garage in 
excess of 60 years. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE APPELLANT ACQUIRED HIS HOME AND REAL PROPERTY BY A 
DIRECT CONVEYANCE FROM SUMMIT COUNTY. 
Appellee's Brief confuses factual statements and the 
language of the relevant documents with conclusions of law. 
Appellee argues that because the tax deed to Emil Nyman in 1937 
does not specifically describe property located in Lot 17, then 
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no interest was transferred to Nyman in Lot 17. That legal 
conclusion does not follow. As previously discussed in Section 
I, subsection B of his Brief, Appellant's predecessors received 
their interest in the subject property in a direct conveyance 
from Summit County.2 
The fact is that Appellant's predecessor, Backman, 
originally acquired land in Blocks 75 and 76 of the Park City 
Survey "according to possession" R.305 (emphasis added). That 
land of Backman's, whatever it was, was taken by Summit County 
for non-payment of taxes. That same land of Backman's, whatever 
it was, was sold in 193 7 by Summit County to Nyman. Facts do not 
comprise a severance; severance is a legal statement or 
conclusion to be drawn from the fact of the predecessors' 
possession and Summit County's conveyance to those predecessors. 
The legal conclusion, that the tax deed actually conveyed what 
the County took from Bachman, regardless of completeness of legal 
description and enumerated lot numbers, is one of the issues 
presented in this appeal. Appellee would have the Court believe 
that the County's tax assessments relate solely to that property 
described in the tax roll. Yet that circumstance is inconsistent 
with the actual assessments historically made by the County in 
At the time of the conveyance to the Appellee, Summit 
County could only convey what it owned. Summit County had 
previously conveyed the disputed property to the Appellant's 
predecessors. 
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this case. The tax notices relating to the taxes assessed 
against Appellant reflect assessments against the home and 
outbuildings independent from the separate assessments for real 
estate. See R. 306-376. And, significantly, the relative values 
attributed respectively to the land and to the structures 
undeniably demonstrate that the County was not assessing only the 
100-150 square feet of Lots 18 and 19 contained within the 
overall area possessed and controlled by the Appellant and his 
predecessors. It defies logic and reason to assert or to believe 
that the County historically has intended and effected a 
mismatched tax assessment scheme where structures in one location 
and real property in a disjointed location are intentionally 
assessed and taxed together under one tax identification number 
and account. 
The extent and configuration of the land possessed by the 
Appellant and his predecessors is not in dispute, despite 
Appellee's assertions that the legal descriptions are vague and 
that the record lacks support. Backman's ownership related to a 
"... house ..., the steps leading down to said Empire Canyon ... 
with all outbuildings and improvements ... and sufficient space 
around the same for the convenient use and occupation thereof". 
R. 304 (emphasis added). Backman's property was also described 
"as Lots 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32 of Block 75 and Lots 18 and 19 
of Block 76 ... according to possession". R. 305 (emphasis 
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added). Appellant prepared and provided a survey of the property 
demonstrating those lines of possession. R. 303. No objection to 
this boundary has been presented or preserved, and no counter 
assertion regarding which land is at issue has been made or 
presented, against Appellant's factual statements establishing 
this boundary. No objection can now be presented that the survey 
does not correspond to the actual boundaries defining the 
property purchased by Appellant and his predecessors from the 
County or that the survey does not accurately set out what has 
been owned and occupied by Appellant's predecessors. Issues not 
preserved in the lower court cannot be raised on appeal. As a 
general matter, appellate courts will not consider an issue 
raised for the first time on appeal. Those issues not raised are 
waived and cannot be considered on appeal. Condas v. Condas, 618 
P.2d 491, 495 n. 8 (Utah 1980). 
Appellee's argument that the exclusion of any reference to 
"Lot 17" in the Appellant's legal descriptions precludes 
Appellant from obtaining any interest in disputed parcel ignores 
facts that the original deeds relate to property held "by 
possession". Appellee selectively accepts language from the 
deeds and assessment records which state Lot 17, on the part of 
Appellee, and Lots 18 and 19, on the part of Appellant, and 
Appellee ignores the language of the original deeds relating to 
property as being defined by possession. A simple inspection of 
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the survey itself demonstrates why the parties used that language 
nearly a century ago. Lot 17 in Block 76 lies parallel with, but 
west of, Lot 27 in Block 75. The Snyder special warranty deed 
(R. 305) describes a broad collection of lots, supplemented with 
and clarified by the language ''according to possession" . The 
likelihood that minor, minute, spillover possession into adjacent 
lots could occur was contemplated and addressed by the parties in 
this manner. It is also worth noting in this regard that the 
Grantor in this special warranty deed, W. I. Snyder, Trustee, is 
the same landowner who owned Lot 17 and who was dispossessed for 
tax nonpayment of taxes in Appellee's chain of title. We are now 
concerned with the legal effect of that particular choice of 
language by those ancient parties and by the long term status quo 
honoring that transfer of land, as demonstrated by the long term 
status quo possession of the property. Appellant submits that the 
legal effect was to sever that portion of Lot 17 possessed by 
Appellant's predecessors from the balance of Lot 17. Appellant 
further submits that the legal effect of the tax foreclosure and 
ultimate sale of this property by Summit County to Appellant's 
predecessors was to transfer that severed portion of Lot 17, 
ultimately, to Appellant. 
II. APPELLANT HAS OBTAINED TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
In the event the Court determines that the legal effect of 
the earlier conveyances and tax foreclosure was not to have 
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effected a severance of the portion of Lot 17 in question, then 
Appellant asserts that he and his predecessors have established a 
right to title under the doctrine of adverse possession. 
Appellant agrees with Appellee that in order to prevail 
under the theory of adverse possession, Appellant must prove that 
he has complied precisely with the requirements of the applicable 
statutory provisions. Appellant submits that he had done so. 
Appellant has possessed the land in the statutorily prescribed 
manner for more than the statutory period. Appellant has held 
the land adversely to the title holder. Appellant has paid all 
taxes legally assessed against the land for the statutory seven 
year period. 
Appellee asserts two positions in opposition to Appellant's 
claim. First, Appellee asserts that in order to prevail, 
Appellee must show that he has paid all of the taxes assessed 
against the entirety of Lot 17 for the requisite period. Second, 
Appellee asserts that no adverse possessory rights may accrue 
against lands held by a political subdivision, in this case 
against Summit County. Both assertions are wrong. 
Regarding the first assertion, that Appellant must pay all 
taxes assessed against the entirety of Lot 17, Appellee ignores 
the fact that we are concerned only with the property actually in 
dispute, which is a minor portion of the overall acreage of Lot 
17. The statutory requirements for adverse possession are: 
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... the land has been occupied and claimed for the period of 
seven years continuously, and that the party, his 
predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes which have 
been levied and assessed upon such land according to law. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-12 (1953, as amended)(emphasis added). 
The plain reference to be inferred from the phrase "upon 
such land" is to "the land [which] has been occupied and 
claimed". Appellant does not claim, and has not occupied, any 
portion of Lot 17 other than the sliver of land at issue in the 
underlying action. The adverse possession laws do not require 
claimants to have pay taxes on more property than that to which 
they assert a claim. The laws only require the payment of taxes 
upon precisely that property which the claimants have "occupied 
and claimed". Id. 
Regarding the second assertion that adverse possession 
cannot take place against a political subdivision, Appellee cites 
and relies upon the inapposite case of Averett v. Utah County 
Drainage District No. 1, 763 P.2d 428 (Utah App. 1988) and the 
general rule analysis contained in 3 AM. JUR. 2D Adverse 
Possession § 269. These authorities deal with the public use of 
the property in question. Appellant has already addressed the 
issue of public versus private use and it is worth noting that 
Appellee also acquired his interest in Lot 17 as a result of the 
prior disposition of the property from Summit County into private 
hands. Summit County obviously felt that Lot 17 and other 
property in the surrounding area more appropriately belonged in 
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private rather than public use; Summit County was the selling 
grantor to the predecessors of both Appellant and Appellee, as 
well as other private parties. 
Concerning the Appellee's citations to the state of the law 
in Arizona and Appellee's general arguments regarding the 
inapplicability of the doctrine of adverse possession against the 
State and its political subdivisions, both fail to address or to 
respond to the explicit exception contained in Utah's adverse 
possession statute, UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-13 (1953, as amended). 
This statute is intended to deal with the question of adverse 
possession of public streets, ways and public use lands. This 
issue is distinct from the question of adverse possession against 
non-public use lands owned by political subdivisions of the 
State. Regarding the adverse possession of public lands, it is 
hard to imagine or to conceive, even speaking hypothetically, of 
a factual situation which more closely fits the exception 
contained in the statute than the case at bar. The statute 
states: 
Adverse possession of public streets or ways. No person 
shall be allowed to acquire any right or title in or to any 
lands held by any town, city or county, or the corporate 
authorities thereof, designated for public use as streets, 
lanes, avenues, alleys, parks or public squares, or for any 
other public purpose, by adverse possession thereof, for any 
length of time whatsoever, unless it shall affirmatively 
appear that such town or city or county or the corporate 
authorities thereof have sold, or otherwise disposed of, and 
conveyed such real estate to a purchaser for valuable 
consideration, and that for more than seven years subsequent 
to such conveyance, the purchaser, his grantees or 
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successors in interest, have been in the exclusive, 
continuous and adverse possession of such real estate; in 
which case an adverse title may be acquired. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-13 (1953 as amended) (emphasis added). 
This statute begins by establishing a prohibition against 
the adverse possession of lands held by the government for public 
use. The statute continues by creating an exception to that 
general rule. To trigger the exception to the statutory 
prohibition, one requires: 
1. That the town or city or county or the corporate 
authorities thereof; 
2. Sold, or otherwise disposed of, and conveyed; 
3. Such real property; 
4. To a purchaser for valuable consideration; and 
5. That for more than seven years subsequent to such 
conveyance, the purchaser ... ha[s] been in the exclusive, 
continuous and adverse possession of such real estate, in which 
case an adverse title may be acquired. 
This precisely describes the situation existing in this 
case. Here, Summit County sold property in 1937 to Appellant's 
predecessor for valuable consideration. Appellant and his 
predecessors have been in exclusive, continuous and adverse 
possession of that property since that time. For the period from 
1937, the time when Summit County sold to Appellant's 
predecessors, through 1960, the time of the first tax assessment 
11 
against Lot 17 to Appellee's predecessors, Appellant and his 
predecessors paid all the taxes assessed against the garage (as 
well as the rest of Appellant's property) and, since no other 
taxes were being assessed against Lot 17, Appellant and his 
predecessors paid all of the taxes assessed according to law. 
These taxes were paid by Appellant continuously and on time from 
1937 through 1953, but were paid delinquently in 1954. 
Nevertheless, the 14 year period from 1937 through 1953 stands at 
double the statutory requirement of seven years necessary to 
perfect the adverse title provided under the exception in the 
statute. Appellant has affirmatively shown that he has met the 
various requirements of adverse possession through precise 
compliance. Appellant is entitled to an award of adverse title 
to the 177 square feet of Lot 17 at issue in this case. 
III. EVEN IF THE COURT DETERMINES THAT APPELLANT DOES NOT 
HAVE TITLE PURSUANT TO A DIRECT CONVEYANCE OR ADVERSE 
POSSESSION, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE APPELLANT IS 
ENTITLED TO A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT. 
In the event the Court determines that the legal effect of 
the earlier conveyances and tax foreclosure was not to have 
effected a severance of the portion of Lot 17 in question and the 
Court further determines that no adverse possession of the 
property in question has been established by Appellant, then 
Appellant asserts that he and his predecessors have established a 
prescriptive use or easement against that portion of Lot 17 at 
issue. Thus, the Appellant has a right to continued use of the 
12 
disputed area. 
Appellee attempts to couch the doctrine of prescriptive use 
or easement in terms of some alternative form of adverse 
possession and then to denounce the doctrine as a circumvention 
of the requirements of adverse possession. This legal sleight of 
hand is inaccurate and incorrect. 
The doctrines of adverse possession and prescriptive use or 
easement are two very different concepts with two very different 
goals. The doctrine of adverse possession addresses ownership of 
property and the concept of title. Its policy is to establish 
title to property in persons who meet the doctrine's 
legislatively created requirements. Its goal is to award 
ownership to those persons whose actions and efforts, with 
respect to a particular piece of property, exceed the legal 
thresholds establishing an entitlement or superior right to the 
title. Its result is a transfer of title between the parties. 
It establishes new legal rights and relationships. 
The doctrine of prescriptive use or easement, on the other 
hand, has nothing to do with ownership or title. The doctrine of 
prescriptive use addresses the long term, unmolested use of 
property by non-owners and the concept of status quo. Its policy 
is to recognize and to maintain the long time, indeed historic, 
uses of property by persons who meet the doctrine's judicially 
created requirements. Its goal is to declare the establishment 
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of a status quo regarding conflicting but unchallenged property 
utilization by persons other than the owner of land over very 
long periods of time. Its result is the maintenance of the 
existing status quo between the parties. It does not establish 
new legal rights and relationships. And it certainly does not 
transfer title. 
Appellee argues that the declaration of a prescriptive 
easement in this case awards all of the attributes of ownership 
to the prescriptive claimant. Appellee is simply wrong. 
Appellee still holds a significant portion of the "bundle of 
rights" that ownership represents. Appellee continues to own the 
underlying property and could include the square footage of the 
property in the overall square footage of his property generally 
for purposes of planning and zoning entitlements. Appellee 
retains the right to prevent the Appellant from altering his 
prescriptive use of the property. Appellee's continuing 
ownership gives Appellee standing in regards to legal proceedings 
concerning the property in question. And, perhaps most 
significantly, Appellee receives a full restoration of his 
"bundle of rights of ownership" to the property in question when 
the prescriptive use ceases. None of this is the case under an 
award of title pursuant to adverse possession. Simply put, 
Appellee's statement that "it [prescriptive rights] is a fee 
simple interest" is simply wrong. 
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Appellee also is wrong on another count. Appellee states 
that "Appellant is attempting to gain title to the property, 
underlying the garage, prescriptively without proving all of the 
elements necessary to acquire title by adverse possession." 
Appellee's Brief at 22. This is not so. Appellant is requesting 
that the Court declare exactly what the law provides. Appellant 
is not asking for the Court to grant more than the law provides. 
If the Appellant has demonstrated his right to title to the 
disputed parcel, then Appellant is entitled to that award and the 
Court should give it to him. If the Appellant has not 
demonstrated this right, then he should not receive that award. 
But the analysis and decision regarding maintaining the status 
quo between these parties is completely independent of that 
question of title. 
As far as the claim by Appellant for a prescriptive easement 
is concerned, it is this Court which established the requirements 
for that right. It is this Court which decided that twenty years 
of open and continuous use of land under a claim of right gives 
rise to a presumption of adverse use. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 
961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998). It is this Court which declared that 
this open, continuous and adverse use of another's land under 
claim of right for twenty years establishes a prescriptive 
easement. Appellant submits that the record is clear regarding 
his having met these requirements. Appellant submits that, 
15 
regardless of the Court's ultimate determination on the state of 
the title of the disputed parcel, Appellant is entitled to an 
order declaring the prescriptive use and maintaining the status 
quo which has existed on this land for over fifty years. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the foregoing and the argument and contents set 
forth in the Brief of Appellant, this Court should determine that 
the trial court erroneously concluded that the Appellant has no 
right to the property underlying his garage either through a 
direct conveyance, adverse possession or prescriptive use. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J * day of July, 2002. 
¥fo^<&¥^ 
John R. tyefimer 
Kimberly E^X Washburn 
At torneys fo r Appel lan t 
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